The case for keeping Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger within ECOWAS
On why the ECOWAS leadership should avoid playing into the hands of junta leaders in the Sahelian states
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I: When landlocked countries decide to cut their noses to spite their faces
This post was due to come out mid next week but parts of it have since been overtaken by events (it’s always nice when policymakers see the light!) Earlier today (February 24, 2024) ECOWAS announced the suspension of sanctions against the military governments in the region (see communique). The move is welcome for the reasons outlined in this post.
From a trade and logistics standpoint, the only thing worse than being landlocked is being landlocked while at loggerheads with all your transit neighbors. Yet last month the governments of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger announced their intention to pull out of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Among other things, they cited economic sanctions and political meddling as the reasons behind their decision. Unless they withdraw their notices, the three countries will formally cease to be members of ECOWAS in early 2025. But even before then, they have vowed to implement a de facto exit immediately. Last November the three countries established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) a security and defense pact designed to protect them against foreign military interventions.
The decision to leave ECOWAS will not be without economic and political costs.
While the share of formal intra-ECOWAS trade remains low (at below 15% of total), the three countries are landlocked and depend on coastal ECOWAS states for all manner of formal and informal trade (especially for food and fast-moving consumer goods). Even if smuggling makes up for the difference, the curtailment of easy movement for people and goods will lead to shortages and price increases. The higher cost of movement will also apply to Sahelian migrant workers who move South (say Burkinabes in Cote d’Ivoire) and human traffickers who run Europe-bound transit routes through Mali and Niger.
Despite these potential costs, the decision may have been made possible by the fact that all three mostly export gold to non-ECOWAS states. Over 96% of Mali’s export is gold, much of it destined for the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Burkina Faso is in the same league (85% of exports), with Switzerland being the main buyer. Niger’s gold exports comprise 71% of its total trade, also mostly to the UAE.
Their landlockedness notwithstanding, the AES bloc is not completely without leverage vis-a-vis the rest of ECOWAS — including members of the West African Monetary and Economic Union (WAEMU) — and major global commodity importers:
the AES constitutes over 30% of the WAEMU GDP. These states boast substantial resource deposits, with Niger ranking as the 7th largest global producer of uranium, Burkina Faso holding the position of the third-largest cotton producer in Africa in 2020, and collectively producing around 70% of the region’s gold in 2022.
The political ramifications will also be significant. Exit will sever important institutionalized supranational checks on the juntas’ power — whether through mere rhetoric or mechanisms like the ECOWAS Court of Justice. Further isolation will undoubtedly push these countries ever closer to Russia (both as a security and economic partner). Potential state collapse would be squarely on the cards amidst deteriorating economic and security conditions. Finally, it would be a symbolic blow to the dream of Continental integration in the sub-region through shared infrastructure and trade. Ominously, the juntas are likely to benefit from the initial hardship caused by border closures. They will spin it as the cost of sovereignty (those who glibly dismiss their sovereigntist rhetoric do so at their own peril).
Two factors suggest that the juntas might just get away with leaving ECOWAS (if they don’t withdraw their notices). First, if popular reactions to the bite of current sanctions are any indication, they might successfully frame future economic disruptions as evidence of foreign sabotage and rally their publics in the name of sovereigntist patriotism. In other words, leaving ECOWAS will likely not come with an immediate political cost. That might just buy them the time they need to further consolidate their hold on power (including by purging “unpatriotic” critics who point out the costs of economic and political isolation).
Second, ECOWAS will struggle to economically isolate the three countries. Benin and Togo, who benefit from logistics businesses as transit countries (see map above), are likely to look the other way as trade continues with their landlocked neighbors to the north — it’s telling that their presidents have been the most conciliatory ECOWAS leaders towards the juntas. Even Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal would struggle to cut off Burkina Faso and Mali, despite their official hardline position against the juntas. At least for now, the countries remain part of the West African Monetary and Economic Union (WAEMU) and still use the bloc’s common currency, the CFA.
The combined effects of a shared (convertible) currency and high levels of informality in (il)licit cross-border trade across the sub-region will make it hard for governments to monitor and prevent movement of goods across borders.
All this to say that the threat to leave ECOWAS by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger is credible. The juntas can plausibly survive the costs associated with the exit, in no small part because (at least initially) doing so will boost their political cover.
II: The case for keeping Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger within ECOWAS
In a recent letter from General Yakubu Gowon — former president of Nigeria and the founding leader of ECOWAS — offered some blunt recommendations on the best possible path to avoiding a fracturing of the regional economic community (REC). As a way forward, he called for the following:
Lifting of all sanctions that have been imposed on Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger
Withdrawal by Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger of their notices to leave ECOWAS
Participation of all 15 ECOWAS Heads of State in a Summit to discuss the future of the community, regional security and stability, as well as the role of the international community given the current geopolitical context.
I agree with General Gowon. Over the last two years ECOWAS leaders (especially the four major countries — Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal) have demonstrated a serious lack of understanding of what motivates the putschists in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and Niger and their domestic supporters. This misunderstanding has so far gotten in the way of serious reality-based negotiations about the potential pathways forward.
It’s not ideal that these countries are under military rule. However, the imperative to uphold the norm against coups within ECOWAS and across the Continent should be pursued with a clear understanding of each country’s domestic politics. In order to avoid an escalation that leads to the fracturing of ECOWAS, Gowon’s call for an olive branch to the juntas ought to be heeded. Given the dire economic situation faced by their citizens, raging insurgencies, and the current geopolitical moment, cutting the juntas off would create more problems than would be solved by the move.
Recall that the coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger were symptoms of a fundamental breakdown of regular politics (and not just instances of of power-hungry officers imposing themselves on their societies). Under the circumstances, insistence on a swift return to “democracy” makes little sense. There is an unfolding security nightmare that requires urgent attention. Sanctioning these countries into deeper poverty will only worsen the security and economic situation, and strengthen the putschists’ hold on power — or worse, occasion total state collapse. As long as these countries face serious security threats, the path to stable regular civilian politics will take a lot more than just holding elections. History teaches us that it takes a lot of time to cycle out of coup traps.
Importantly, it is irresponsible to trivialize the putchists’ sovereigntist claims to power and populist rhetoric as inauthentic. This plays right into their nationalist narratives and will reinforce their siege mentality and continued popularity among pivotal domestic political actors. Like all politicians everywhere, the juntas are cross-pressured and motivated by (i) a hunger for power; (ii) pursuit of personal material benefit; (iii) desire for popular support; and (iv) policy considerations. Often, there is a tendency to reduce African leaders to just (i) and (ii) and ignore everything else they say and do that might contradict people’s stylized beliefs. The fact of the matter is that moralizing over the juntas’ sincerity is immaterial at this point. That they are military dictators is not in question. But it also matters that they rose to power by articulating popular policy concerns that were being ignored by those in power. Trivializing their publics’ popular concerns, while also imposing sanctions, will only strengthen the putschists’ domestic political standing.
To be clear, there is a lot to dislike about the military juntas in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger. They look and feel like power-hungry repressive autocrats. Despite their sovereigntist populism, they have shown to be willing to hire mercenaries that deepen their dependence on foreign governments. Their precarious hold on power continues to expose them to foreign manipulation, and a reliance on arbitrary violence against their domestic populations. The Sahelian trio, in particular, do not appear to have coherent security or economic plans in the face of catastrophic violence and endemic poverty. And above all, they have shown a proclivity to expressive recklessness in service to populism — as shown in their plan to exit ECOWAS.
Yet it is precisely for these reasons that ECOWAS should avoid adopting hardline positions that play into the juntas’ hands. Casting them aside will not magically seal them off from the rest of the region. The coastal states will remain vulnerable to both the spread of insecurity and populist sovereigntist politics.
Beyond the domestic and intra-ECOWAS politics, it is interesting that General Gowon referenced “the role of the international community given the current geopolitical context.”
To be blunt, so far an important sticking point for the juntas and their sympathizers has been the fact that ECOWAS has not done a good job of convincing everyone that it is not France’s tool (the veracity of these claims is immaterial; perceptions have given them considerable political space). This matters because a leading source of legitimacy for the juntas has been anti-French sovereigntist politycs. With that in mind, it would be a mistake to delegate the “Sahel file” to Cote d’Ivoire or Senegal. Furthermore, it does not help matters that Nigerian President Bola Tinubu seems keen on spending a lot of time in France. The failure by ECOWAS to signal its sovereigntist credentials has been a boon for the putschists and continues to be a non-trivial driver of their domestic popularity (or more accurately, toleration by segments of their populations). To counter this, ECOWAS must deliberately invest in demonstrating that it understands the politics that fueled the rise of the juntas in the first place.
The claim here is not that all ECOWAS has to do is differentiate itself from France and all will be well. It will take a long time and a lot of effort to establish order and regular politics in the Sahelian states. Rather, the point is that confidence-building ought to be the number one priority in order to buy time and give constructive dialogue a chance. Otherwise, the two sides will keep talking past each other and end up taking actions that will prove catastrophic for ordinary citizens in the three Sahelian states. Meanwhile, the putschists will keep winning the narrative game in the court of public opinion within and outside their countries.
There is no shame in admitting that the juntas have won the initial game of chicken: in threatening to leave ECOWAS they’ve credibly demonstrated their recklessness in service to their personal and political objectives. Now the responsible thing for ECOWAS to do is to swerve and not crush into their schemes at full speed.
To reiterate, keeping the three countries within the ECOWAS fold is an imperative that will buy time for constructive dialogue; minimize the economic cost of the current security crises; reduce the chances of state collapse; and limit the three states’ need for total dependence on rapacious foreign mercenaries. Heeding General Gowon’s call should not be viewed as appeasement or a sign that the regional anti-coup norm is no longer enforceable. Instead, it would signal political maturity, geopolitical awareness, and bolster the credibility of the ECOWAS leadership as honest neighborly brokers and not mere tools of others.
III: A new phase in Pan-Africanism?
Looking beyond West Africa, the current crisis in ECOWAS is symptomatic of a problem that Africa’s regional economic communities (RECs) as well as the African Union will increasingly have to deal with. In the current multipolar world, different African countries will be pulled in different directions conditional on their domestic interests and politics. Consequently, it will become harder to manufacture consensus on responses during crises; the problem of forum shopping will worsen; individual countries, however small, will not be easily boxed into compliance; and open inter-state disagreements will become the norm.
Examples of this trend abound. The African Union and RECs such as IGAD, the East African Community, and Southern Africa Development Community are already dealing with sharp internal divisions over Ethiopia’s apparent intention to recognize Somaliland, Rwanda’s support of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and whether or not to take sides in Sudan’s ongoing civil war. Notably, the emerging coalitions across the different cleavages are coalescing around major and middle powers like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, China, or the United States and its Western allies.
With this in mind, the African Union and the region’s various RECs should reflect on General Gowon’s message and avoid playing host to outsiders’ geopolitical contests. Their focus should be on solving regional problems in a manner that prioritizes the interests and welfare of Africans. General Gowon’s plea should also be viewed as a challenge to potential regional hegemons like Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt to step up their geopolitical awareness and do a better job of directing traffic in the quest to address the Continent’s many pressing challenges.
Thanks for the insight. I believe we need to go back to the basics and look at how the EU got started. Part of the Schuman Declaration (May 9, 1950), is very insightful: it starts with an industrial project, the European Coal and Steel Community. A regional industrial project is key because it makes the participants interdependent.
How did ECOWAS start? The wrong way, unfortunately. ECOWAS membership does not reflect countries' ability to add value to the integration process. It is geographic.
Regional integration involves making sacrifices (like losing import tax revenue). If there isn't anything that far exceeds those sacrifices, countries will not want to stay in or contribute to deepening the process. That's the story of ECOWAS.
In 49 years, there has not been an industrial project to bring the countries together. Yes, the free movement of goods and people (still not 100% effective though) is an achievement, but you've got to do more.
Today, Nigeria builds (assembles) cars, and Benin, its neighbor, makes beautiful T-shirts. The ECOWAS Commission has failed to make member countries interdependent through industrial projects. I wish AES countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) would focus on fostering economic interdependence.
I really appreciate and fully concur not just with this article in particular but the whole philosophy of not abandoning institutions in frustrations but to do the hard work of fighting for them and nurturing them. Recently there I have heard lots of complaints from people from different political tribes have regarding different international institutions like EU, UN, Nato, etc. I am sympathetic to some of them. But we should rather do the hard work of amending the institutions and doing compromises rather than taking the easy path of abandoning it.