The geopolitics of the war in Sudan
The geopolitics of the war in Sudan
How external actors are prolonging the war and complicating potential avenues to a peaceful settlement
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I: How is the African Union letting this happen?
There is a reason Sudan’s peace talks are (likely?) going to happen in Geneva (and Jeddah before that) and not in an African capital. So before discussing the geopolitics of the conflict in Sudan, it’s worth highlighting the failures of the African Union and other regional organizations. Whether individually or collectively, African states have proven time and again that they cannot perform the most basic function: protecting African lives in the region and abroad. The figures from Sudan are astonishing. More than 10 million are internally displaced. 25 million are facing acute hunger. Famine has been declared in parts of the country. By all measures this war has been a humanitarian catastrophe.
The death toll commonly cited in the media — just over 15,000 — is definitely an undercount. Simple aggregation from battle deaths from known clashes and atrocities so far suggest at least 65,000 deaths. Existing research points in the direction of an even higher death toll. For example, a 2021 study by James Fearon and Andrew Shaver found that the median conflict since 1990 produced 18 refugees per death. The average for the same was 30, with an interquartile range of 9 to 41. Going by these estimates, and taking placing Sudan at the 75th percentile (one death per 41 displaced), the death toll could be be as high as 244,000. Assuming a much higher displacement per death, say 100, would still yield an unconscionable over 100,000 deaths. Notice that this is without taking into account ongoing famine and the “background” humanitarian problems that have bedeviled Sudan’s peripheries for decades. The Wall Street Journal cites an estimate of 150,000 dead.
How is the African Union letting this happen? Whatever happened to “African solutions to African problems?”
Readers might find it odd to even consider that the AU has any role to play in Sudan. After all, everyone in the region seems to be sitting on their hands waiting for the “international community” (read the US and the European Union) to do something — the half-hearted mediation efforts and civilian processes simply do not count as serious ceasefire efforts. It also doesn’t help that neighboring African leaders have taken sides with the belligerents — a move that has effectively neutered IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development), the best-placed potential arena for a peace process. However, it’s important not to give these regional institutions a pass. The African Union and other regional organizations must work. They must work first as mechanisms of conflict resolution and as guarantors of human security, and second as facilitators of regional commercial relations.
The failures of these institutions are on African political leaders and diplomats — arguably the most complacent elites in the world. Their casual toleration of genocidal violence in Sudan dehumanizes not only its victims but also the entire community of Africans. The war’s complicated historical background notwithstanding, it should’ve been possible to prevent the fighting from escalating and push for a quick settlement. That no African countries/leaders stepped up will forever be a source of deep regional shame. Africa and its peoples deserve better.
One hopes that the deep shame of this moment will give way to a renewed commitment to human security in the region. Lest we forget, it was the disastrous conflicts in the Mano River Region that motivated President Olusegun Obasanjo and others to reimagine the OAU’s peace and security architecture. In the same vein, the conflict in Sudan should challenge the region into designing coercive checks against elite-driven conflicts of this nature. “Silencing the guns” shouldn’t just be a slogan parroted by Africa’s deeply complacent elites at summits.
II: It’s never a good idea to host others’ fights
The accident of geography has added a complicated texture to Sudan’s war. Internally, Khartoum has struggled for decades to govern geographically disparate regions and populations. It’s also in a neighborhood that suffers from political underdevelopment and wars; and which is also important for major and minor global powers while also straddling two geopolitical zones (Africa and Southwest Asia). For these reasons, the externalization of Sudan comes with unique challenges to conflict resolution.
Besides rendering regional organizations useless and fueling a forum shopping craze, externalization has made Sudan’s conflict intractable in two important ways. First, it has allowed the belligerents to not internalize the cost of war. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are fighting without a care for civilians or Sudan’s post-conflict future. Despite its veneer of legitimacy, SAF has targeted civilians and armed a mushrooming array of self-defense forces that have credibly been accused of ethnic cleansing. On its part, the RSF hasn’t even bothered with the idea of credible “rebel governance” as its mercenary forces kill and loot throughout the country — it’s telling that civilians prefer to live in SAF-controlled areas. This approach to war leaves little room for compromise and post-conflict accommodation by the warring sides.
Second, the incompatibilities introduced by the belligerents’ external supporters (e.g., regional dominance) aren’t entirely congruent with the underlying drivers of Sudan’s conflict. In other words, ending the conflict isn’t a first order priority for the external actors backing both the RSF and SAF — precisely since a peaceful resolution founded on compromise isn’t compatible with the external actors’ zero sum games. As always, it’s a bad idea to host others’ fights.
So who are the external actors in Susan’s war and what exactly do they want?
There are multiple subplots to this drama. The main external actor is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which backs the RSF. Two factors underpin the UAE’s tie-up with the RSF. First, there is inertia from the war in Yemen (where RSF supplied mercenaries) and gold trading/smuggling through Dubai (the RSF’s leader Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo has interests). I use the word “inertia” here advisedly, and doubt that that Abu Dhabi would pick the RSF as the vehicle for its Sudan/Red Sea policy. Second, the UAE views Sudan as a key plank of its geopolitical dreams (at the expense of its Gulf rivals) in the Red Sea/Horn and throughout Africa — with interests in petroleum, critical minerals, power generation, climate financing, tourism, agriculture, telecoms, ports and logistics, etc. To this end, Abu Dhabi has leveraged its ties with several African governments to the RSF’s advantage. These include Chad, Libya (Haftar faction), Ethiopia, South Sudan, Kenya, Rwanda, and South Africa.
Regional governments whose states border Sudan have found different reasons to bandwagon (or not) with the UAE and the RSF. Ethiopia needs Emirati cash, support in its efforts to access the sea through Somaliland, and a tool to check Egyptian influence in Sudan. South Sudan is desperate to keep oil flowing to the Red Sea, and has been willing to pay protection fees (RSF) and tariffs (SAF) to both sides in the conflict. That said, South Sudan has strong financial incentives to be firmly within the UAE orbit. Despite the complicated domestic (ethnic) politics of Sudan’s war, Chad is firmly in the UAE orbit and has proven to be an important supply route for arms and foreign fighters recruited by the RSF. As part of the UAE orbit N’Djamena stands to receive both military and civilian aid from Abu Dhabi, not to mention direct gains from Sudan’s war economy as the RSF’s main logistical hub. Finally, Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army also backs the RSF. The two share a patron in the UAE, with the RSF having supported Haftaar’s forces in the past.
Notice that among its immediate neighbors, the SAF is overmatched. Only Egypt and Eritrea can be counted as its allies. Egypt is a natural ally to the SAF, mostly on account of history (and despite SAF’s dalliance with Islamists). Cairo would prefer to maintain its longstanding relationship with SAF and influence in Khartoum. It would also like to keep Ethiopia out. To complicate matters, Egypt and the UAE get along fine on issues unrelated to Sudan — Cairo recently received a $35b cash injection from Abu Dhabi. Eritrea’s decision to side with the SAF has a two-way explanation. First, despite being close during the war in Yemen (Eritrea hosted an Emirati base), relations have since cooled between Asmara and Abu Dhabi. These days Eritrea gravitates towards Saudi Arabia. Second, it was almost preordained that, in addition to exploiting the opportunity to create dependence by supporting ethnic groups that straddle the Eritrea-Sudan border, Asmara would enter the fray against whichever side Ethiopia chose.
Although allied to the SAF, Saudi Arabia has so far projected an image of neutrality and humanitarian assistance. Riyadh has also hosted peace talks in Jeddah (and now Geneva). That said, Saudi assistance to the SAF is very likely being laundered through Egypt’s air support operations.
Further afield, there is a loose cluster of alliances of convenience that tend to be overblown because of the characters involved. The SAF gets mostly drones from Iran. Russia initially supported the RSF via the Wagner Group’s contractors (a move that precipitated Ukrainian support of SAF forces), but has since reconsidered and switched sides (Ukraine has shown no signs of switching to the RSF and has ceased being a player in the conflict). Both Moscow and Tehran are keen to establish a naval foothold in Port Sudan.
Notably, China has remained neutral in the conflict and kept away from any direct involvement with the belligerents after evacuating its nationals. Beijing’s major exposure to the conflict remains to be its investments in South Sudan’s oil sector and Sudan’s $1.3b export market. In 2023 China deployed hundreds of UN peacekeepers in South Sudan.
At the moment Sudan isn’t a priority for major Western countries. The U.S. views Sudan (and the Horn/Red Sea) mainly through the prism of its Middle East policy and the Abraham Accords (which triggered the end of most sanctions). It’s not a coincidence that even before war broke out recent U.S. envoys have spent more of their time in Abu Dhabi/Riyadh/Jeddah than in the region. There’s also some residual concern over Iran/Russia/China influence in Sudan and the wider Red Sea/Horn region. The European Union’s main concern has been the flow of migrants to its shoes; and funded the government’s autocratic crackdowns of migrant flows. In varying ways, both the US and EU accommodated the RSF-SAF junta duopoly before the onset of war. Although no longer as influential as it used to be, the United Kingdom (UK) was perhaps the best-placed Western country to significantly shape outcomes in Sudan. But London has long decimated its diplomatic clout in the region via austerity and erosion of capacity.
Importantly, the UAE retains considerable influence over Western governments via the Abraham Accords and its importance for their Middle East policy, cash, and regular reminders of the specter of Islamists taking over in Khartoum.
III: How the geopolitics of war impacts the possibility for a peaceful settlement
As noted above, external meddling has allowed the main belligerents to adopt total war strategies that deemphasize “normal” politics. Despite the continued failure to capture El Fasher, the RSF is militarily on the front foot, but has so far provided little evidence that it is interested in actually governing — beyond its loose alliance with a section of civilian leaders and strong anti-Islamist rhetoric. Its lack of command and control, including of foreign mercenaries, has been a total disaster for civilians. Forced to flee to Port Sudan but with access to external assistance, the SAF has found itself having to cobble together alliances of convenience and cut deals with Islamists and warlords in ways that will complicate peace talks. Important segments of Sudanese society want to turn the page on warlordism and the Islamists’ divisive/extremist politics.
Given the constellation of actors involved, my biggest fear is that Sudan might find itself with a “Libyan Stalemate.” Libya has a Tripoli-based government that’s militarily backed by Italy, Türkiye, and Qatar, and Haftaar’s Tobruk-based Libyan National Army that’s mainly backed by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Russia, and France.
The biggest danger posed by a “Libyan Stalemate” is that it would be stable despite enormous costs to civilians. Its stability would be due to the cross-cutting interests of the external actors involved. Ironically, ability to cooperate on other domains besides Sudan will work against the development of any sense of urgency to end the conflict. For example, Egypt and Qatar can strike deals without having to crowd in a resolution of their differences over Sudan. In other words, the cost of disagreement over Sudan will be largely contained and under the control of external backers of the belligerents.
With that in mind, the only way to remove the geopolitical barriers to a real peace process would be to convince the pivotal external backers (especially the UAE) to stand back. That is highly unlikely. Like in Libya, external actors in Sudan continue to violate international norms (and laws) without any consequences.
All this means that there’s little reason to be optimistic about the planned talks in Geneva (if they ever take off). The fighting will go on until either side wins or there is a military stalemate that begets a political “Libyan Stalemate.” The RSF have every reason to ride their momentum and push for a military victory. The SAF have little to lose from insisting that they are the legitimate government and to do everything to cling to power (even if it means institutionalizing warlordism and allying with Islamists).
IV: What would happen if the RSF wins?
The current state of affairs suggests that a stalemate is the most likely outcome. However, there are three other possible outcomes. Though remote, a victory by the SAF would likely yield a relatively familiar military dictatorship backed by Islamists and preoccupied with peripheral wars — basically, Sudan for most of its postcolonial history. The establishment of a civilian constitutional government looks unlikely any time soon.
The third possibility would be an outright victory by the RSF. It would also present Sudan with a new set of complex challenges. It’s striking how little Hemedti has done to signal even the vaguest interest in government. He’s no champion of “rebel governance” in the mold of storied rebel leaders who won it all like Kagame, Efewerki, Museveni, or Meles. Instead, Hemedti and the RSF have singularly focused on winning and benefitting from the war economy no matter the cost to civilians. Because of this, I’ve come to heavily discount the RSF’s loose relationship with civilian political formations as a potential path to a stable post-conflict settlement (whereby, presumably, the fighters and mercenaries will go to the barracks and submit to civilian control?) Leopards don’t change their spots.
All this to say that the jury is still out on what sort of settlement would actually achieve lasting peace and stability. And I would argue that the uncertainty over the nature of the post-conflict order is a non-trivial mental block to an immediate ceasefire. If they haven’t done so already, the sponsors of the talks in Riyadh/Geneva ought to consider clearly mapping out post-conflict worlds in order to focus minds on the importance of a ceasefire now.
Cc @Claire Berlinski
Masterpiece article. However, there’s another dimension of the conflict, which you either deliberately or unintentionally ignored, the tribal aspect in it.