You make a compelling case. Which is depressing, because surely the only way for Ethiopia to have reliable control over a seaport is for Ethiopia to take ownership of one. And there's no way that doesn't involve the sound of sixteen horseshoes getting every closer.
I can't help but think of how inflammatory the military/navy element would be received by the rest of the horn. The memory of Ethiopian colonialism is very strong, especially among Somali and Eritreans. I'm also not sure it gets Ethiopia much. Having a navy isn't much leverage over Djibouti (the ultimate gatekeeper) and it's extensive foreign support. In the short run, making deals with Somaliland and Djibouti to have partial ownership over both ports seems like a better bet. Developing options would give Addis leverage. Developing a costly navy in a stretch of ocean well protected by established great powers doesn't make sense to me. Especially given the costly internal conflicts that Ethiopia must adequately deal with before projecting power abroad.
An under-appreciated driver of Ethiopia's many problems is the tendency to always be inward-looking and fighting over a small pie. Looking outward (peacefully, but with the ability to protect its interests) would be a good way to shifting attention away from the identity-driven distributive politics.
A richer more outward oriented Ethiopia would go a long way in solving many of its domestic political problems.
Oops I missed this- although I guess this thread remains even more relevant now then ever. Thanks for your reply. I agree that a richer Ethiopia is likely a more stable Ethiopia- but I am not convinced it would be less internally focused. It seems like the opposite dynamic is at play here- internal need for prestige driving aspirations for a navy. Although my view is tainted by the weak historical Ethiopian navy (especially under the Derg) which from what I understand was a symbolic project that lacked real fighting ability and served best as method of distributing patronage
An interesting issue here, is why Sonaliland has never achieved international recognition, and the pros and cons of its international recognition. It looks a relatively functional country; I am not sure to what extent there is a Somali government.
African states have never been open to secessions unless there is a very compelling case (like in Eritrea and South Sudan). Somaliland does not have a compelling case beyond having had a different colonial power and the fact that it cycled out of the civil war well before the rest of Somalia.
A really useful overview that we don't get to read all too often. Thank you!
Very good piece; thanks.
You make a compelling case. Which is depressing, because surely the only way for Ethiopia to have reliable control over a seaport is for Ethiopia to take ownership of one. And there's no way that doesn't involve the sound of sixteen horseshoes getting every closer.
And thank you very much for the great work
I can't help but think of how inflammatory the military/navy element would be received by the rest of the horn. The memory of Ethiopian colonialism is very strong, especially among Somali and Eritreans. I'm also not sure it gets Ethiopia much. Having a navy isn't much leverage over Djibouti (the ultimate gatekeeper) and it's extensive foreign support. In the short run, making deals with Somaliland and Djibouti to have partial ownership over both ports seems like a better bet. Developing options would give Addis leverage. Developing a costly navy in a stretch of ocean well protected by established great powers doesn't make sense to me. Especially given the costly internal conflicts that Ethiopia must adequately deal with before projecting power abroad.
An under-appreciated driver of Ethiopia's many problems is the tendency to always be inward-looking and fighting over a small pie. Looking outward (peacefully, but with the ability to protect its interests) would be a good way to shifting attention away from the identity-driven distributive politics.
A richer more outward oriented Ethiopia would go a long way in solving many of its domestic political problems.
Oops I missed this- although I guess this thread remains even more relevant now then ever. Thanks for your reply. I agree that a richer Ethiopia is likely a more stable Ethiopia- but I am not convinced it would be less internally focused. It seems like the opposite dynamic is at play here- internal need for prestige driving aspirations for a navy. Although my view is tainted by the weak historical Ethiopian navy (especially under the Derg) which from what I understand was a symbolic project that lacked real fighting ability and served best as method of distributing patronage
An interesting issue here, is why Sonaliland has never achieved international recognition, and the pros and cons of its international recognition. It looks a relatively functional country; I am not sure to what extent there is a Somali government.
African states have never been open to secessions unless there is a very compelling case (like in Eritrea and South Sudan). Somaliland does not have a compelling case beyond having had a different colonial power and the fact that it cycled out of the civil war well before the rest of Somalia.