Far be it from me to defend Museveni from history’s judgment, but I’m skeptical of the idea there was a significantly better version of Uganda in 2023 on offer that he missed. He’s certainly had his share of mistakes and squandered opportunities but Uganda is not much poorer or less stable than its neighbors. Their GDP is about the same as Tanzania, despite being landlocked and Tanzania’s vast mineral resources. Has the CCM’s ‘illustrious history’ really led to better outcomes than his ‘Potemkin party’?
Consider the regional situation around the time he rose to power: a communist military junta which overthrew a decaying feudal empire in Ethiopia; a neocolonial kleptocracy wearing the costume of a capitalist democracy in Kenya; Nyerere‘s ujamaa experiment in Tanzania; a weak parliamentary democracy presiding over a vicious civil war in Sudan, which soon yielded to ethnoreligious totalitarianism; a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in Somalia. The only thing more striking than the diversity of systems and personalities and ideologies at the time is the uniformity of their failure. How could such a wide variety of characters and situations end up so similarly?
The more one looks into each situation the more one believes that their failure was overdetermined. If one thing hadn’t derailed them another probably would have. Even if Museveni managed to cobble together a more effective elite coalition for a ‘developmental state’ I just don’t see any viable economic strategy he could have pursued given the macro/geopolitical environment at the time. The causes of his failure are primarily structural, as is the case for most of Africa’s post colonial leaders. If we don’t fully understand those causes, we will merely repeat their mistakes.
By “at the time” do you mean the late 1980s or the 30 years after?
As I noted in the article, I think Museveni is better than the modal African leader. But he certainly could’ve done better while sitting atop a hegemonic single party state.
I think you are agreeing with the claim that structural facts on the ground shaped his likelihood of success.
I did indeed mean the late 80s. We’re in agreement on structural issues dictating his outcome, but I will still push back a bit on the idea that he ‘certainly could have done better’: I think even if you put someone like Deng in his place in 1986, Uganda wouldn’t be substantially different today. The fundamentals just weren’t there, and perhaps still aren’t.
I suppose the reason I am pressing this point is that there’s often been this idea (not in this piece) that the main thing that goes wrong with African countries is a leadership that’s inexplicably committed to underdevelopment. Again, African leaders have done many terrible, shortsighted things but let’s not pretend that if it wasn’t for Museveni Uganda would be manufacturing microchips. I find it a little too convenient to pin an entire country’s shortcomings on one man.
Museveni wrote a biography which also served as his political manifesto (Sowing the Mustard Seed) and in that he very correctly identified the tendancy of African leaders to perpetuate themselves in power as a major problem. He challenged himself to create some sustainable instituations that could be passed on and he has failed his own test. Like KO has said, midwifing a transition could be his greatest legacy, but he's gotten himself into a position where he can't do that. UG is stuck and stagnant.
Thank you for this article. It has good insights. Just a small correction;
'Notably, the president’s rating is higher than that reported allegiance to his weakly institutionalized ruling party.'
This not true. This man is not popular at all. He rules under the fear of the gun. I also refute the commenter talking about neocolonial imperialists moralising about stability in the region.
I think the leadership bears the greatest responsibility, because when they seize power, they can decide to either build stronger institutions to ensure checks and balance or reinforce power around themselves. Most choose the latter through simple maximization behavior of their personal interests (political and economic power). As I mentioned in my earlier message, if there are no counteracting forces (like a free press), this is an inevitable outcome. I also blame ourselves (the elite) for being complaisant, either out of fear of prosecution or of personal greed.
I always wondered how Museveni managed to stay in power, while his beloved comrade Jerry Rawlings of Ghana didn’t. The distorted story I had been fed was that Jerry voluntarily stepped down to give a chance to his country for a democratic ruling. I later learned during a short trip to Accra and intense discussions with local colleagues that Jerry was forced to go by a strong free press. Why didn’t that happen in Uganda?
We need to understand that power is like a drug; once hooked, it takes strong intervention (rehab) to get off. Sometimes this “rehab” can be violent.
On a different but related topic, I wonder if Paul Kagame, a discipline of Museveni, is heading in this same direction.
The question is: what can be done to avoid throwing Uganda into chaos after Museveni departure? What role can the US and her allies play?
In my opinion, the US should be mindful of the stability of Uganda in the same way she’s of Kenya. Uganda is essential in the stability of South Sudan, Rwanda, and the DRC. Not only the US has economic benefits in this stability but also security benefits via the control of terrorism. Besides, I think the US has a moral obligation to stabilize this region, given her link to the Mombutu regime and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.
Curious to see more reactions to this from the esteemed African scholars.
Far be it from me to defend Museveni from history’s judgment, but I’m skeptical of the idea there was a significantly better version of Uganda in 2023 on offer that he missed. He’s certainly had his share of mistakes and squandered opportunities but Uganda is not much poorer or less stable than its neighbors. Their GDP is about the same as Tanzania, despite being landlocked and Tanzania’s vast mineral resources. Has the CCM’s ‘illustrious history’ really led to better outcomes than his ‘Potemkin party’?
Consider the regional situation around the time he rose to power: a communist military junta which overthrew a decaying feudal empire in Ethiopia; a neocolonial kleptocracy wearing the costume of a capitalist democracy in Kenya; Nyerere‘s ujamaa experiment in Tanzania; a weak parliamentary democracy presiding over a vicious civil war in Sudan, which soon yielded to ethnoreligious totalitarianism; a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in Somalia. The only thing more striking than the diversity of systems and personalities and ideologies at the time is the uniformity of their failure. How could such a wide variety of characters and situations end up so similarly?
The more one looks into each situation the more one believes that their failure was overdetermined. If one thing hadn’t derailed them another probably would have. Even if Museveni managed to cobble together a more effective elite coalition for a ‘developmental state’ I just don’t see any viable economic strategy he could have pursued given the macro/geopolitical environment at the time. The causes of his failure are primarily structural, as is the case for most of Africa’s post colonial leaders. If we don’t fully understand those causes, we will merely repeat their mistakes.
By “at the time” do you mean the late 1980s or the 30 years after?
As I noted in the article, I think Museveni is better than the modal African leader. But he certainly could’ve done better while sitting atop a hegemonic single party state.
I think you are agreeing with the claim that structural facts on the ground shaped his likelihood of success.
I did indeed mean the late 80s. We’re in agreement on structural issues dictating his outcome, but I will still push back a bit on the idea that he ‘certainly could have done better’: I think even if you put someone like Deng in his place in 1986, Uganda wouldn’t be substantially different today. The fundamentals just weren’t there, and perhaps still aren’t.
I suppose the reason I am pressing this point is that there’s often been this idea (not in this piece) that the main thing that goes wrong with African countries is a leadership that’s inexplicably committed to underdevelopment. Again, African leaders have done many terrible, shortsighted things but let’s not pretend that if it wasn’t for Museveni Uganda would be manufacturing microchips. I find it a little too convenient to pin an entire country’s shortcomings on one man.
Any readings you can share on what you see these structural issues are?
Museveni wrote a biography which also served as his political manifesto (Sowing the Mustard Seed) and in that he very correctly identified the tendancy of African leaders to perpetuate themselves in power as a major problem. He challenged himself to create some sustainable instituations that could be passed on and he has failed his own test. Like KO has said, midwifing a transition could be his greatest legacy, but he's gotten himself into a position where he can't do that. UG is stuck and stagnant.
Thank you for this article. It has good insights. Just a small correction;
'Notably, the president’s rating is higher than that reported allegiance to his weakly institutionalized ruling party.'
This not true. This man is not popular at all. He rules under the fear of the gun. I also refute the commenter talking about neocolonial imperialists moralising about stability in the region.
They are the problem. Decolonise the mind!!!!!!!
I think the leadership bears the greatest responsibility, because when they seize power, they can decide to either build stronger institutions to ensure checks and balance or reinforce power around themselves. Most choose the latter through simple maximization behavior of their personal interests (political and economic power). As I mentioned in my earlier message, if there are no counteracting forces (like a free press), this is an inevitable outcome. I also blame ourselves (the elite) for being complaisant, either out of fear of prosecution or of personal greed.
Wow! Great article!
I always wondered how Museveni managed to stay in power, while his beloved comrade Jerry Rawlings of Ghana didn’t. The distorted story I had been fed was that Jerry voluntarily stepped down to give a chance to his country for a democratic ruling. I later learned during a short trip to Accra and intense discussions with local colleagues that Jerry was forced to go by a strong free press. Why didn’t that happen in Uganda?
We need to understand that power is like a drug; once hooked, it takes strong intervention (rehab) to get off. Sometimes this “rehab” can be violent.
On a different but related topic, I wonder if Paul Kagame, a discipline of Museveni, is heading in this same direction.
The question is: what can be done to avoid throwing Uganda into chaos after Museveni departure? What role can the US and her allies play?
In my opinion, the US should be mindful of the stability of Uganda in the same way she’s of Kenya. Uganda is essential in the stability of South Sudan, Rwanda, and the DRC. Not only the US has economic benefits in this stability but also security benefits via the control of terrorism. Besides, I think the US has a moral obligation to stabilize this region, given her link to the Mombutu regime and the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.
Curious to see more reactions to this from the esteemed African scholars.