I think explicitly ceding more control to larger states would not only go against what most Africans claim to have stood for at independence, it would also set very dangerous precedents.
This also ignores the way in which the current consensus-driven approach was itself the result of a pragmatic compromise. Why would anyone in Benin, for example, wish to see the whims and diktats of Abuja's policymakers given even more formal weight? Would they not decide they may as well back Francafrique? The current US administration has been contemplating absorbing various neighboring countries on the premise that they are too weak to fend for themselves in the big bad world. Crude as their logic may seem, they can at least credibly claim to be capable of offering defense and economic security in return.
To be blunt, all our 'regional hegemons' are simply catspaws for external interests. The various conflicts going aren't getting ignored. African neighbors typically don't just stand by, they have exploited them in the most cynical possible way. A concrete case: Kenya has been actively working to frustrate the defeat of a genocidal militia both diplomatically and through material assistance in exchange for concessionary terms on its debts from certain Gulf states. We nearly got our candidate elected AU chairman: would things have worked out well for Sudan if that position had even more power? And this is hardly an isolated example. Nigeria nearly invaded Niger to restore Bazoum at France's behest. Which of DRC's neighbors could be trusted with "agenda setting powers"? Would you like to see Ethiopia try to do to its neighbors what it has done to its citizens?
Furthermore, any analogy with European integration is deeply misleading: not only was the starting point much higher, there were also the common shocks of WWII and decolonization, the looming threat in the USSR, and of course massive US support. Nowhere else has anything remotely similar succeeded: not in the Middle East, not in South America, not in South/East Asia. A joint command structures for 55 poor countries half of whom are at war with themselves or each other is a pipe dream. As for nuclear deterrents: I confess I simply do not understand the fascination this elicits. Who exactly is being deterred, and from what? In what timeframe? Consider that the French nuclear deterrent, the only real one in Europe, hasn't even been factored into any of Russia's war plans. Of what plausible use would a handful of rudimentary nuclear warheads in Dakar, for example, be in the event of a major power incursion in North Africa? That's without even touching any of the massive practical challenges. I don't think anyone who's seriously looked into this believes it's a remotely workable idea.
The AU has calcified into a toothless organization. So be it. If it is now not capable of much good, at least it cannot do much harm, either by nurturing the delusions of its 'giants' or laundering the malign intentions of hostile external interests. Devolve its responsibilities to the regional bodies, where concrete economic and security planning can happen, adapted to local circumstances and on formally equal terms. If joint defense pacts need to be organized, this can continue at bilateral and regional level. But I can think of no darker future that us doing to each other what we fear being done to us, which is what this proposal would amount to in practice.
You hit the nail on the head with this article. African states are so weak and the larger African states with potentials are not pulling their weight at all.
The conflict in Sudan is almost 3 years and the AU has been so useless in terms of intervention and achieving a resemblance of peace. I wept the other day when I saw tiny Qatar playing peacemaker between Congo and Rwanda.
The 2 head of states were brought in front of a minster in Qatar to begin negotiations. Shame
I can speak from experience, three years of my diplomatic career was on African multilateral affairs, that there are extensive hurdles and challenges facing the revitalization of Pan - Africanism, may of them to do with circles of interests, political will, short vs long term goals, and the cadence of meetings, summits, and as you mentioned in this piece overlapping jurisidctions of various regional organizations.
A challenge to be sure, but one that needs to be addressed swiftly.
Interesting article. Pan-Africanism has always (and will always) be a lofty Utopian dream by African leftists. Being Nigerian, I believe my country should concentrate on strengthening itself, expanding its small manufacturing sector, and uniting the West African subregion under its leadership as it had done successfully in the roaring 1970s. The rest of the continent should go pound sand and deal with themselves. Apart from expressing solidarity, Nigeria should not get too involved in affairs that are outside the West African subregion.
-
Nigeria should never return to the 1960s/1970s/1980s era of trying act Big Brother across the entire continent. That is foolish and would never pay off as experience shows.
-
How many people in Algeria remember that Nigerian government expelled the French Ambassador in January 1961 to protest France’s third nuclear bomb test in the Sahara Desert. The expulsion of the French Ambassador was followed by the closure of all Nigerian sea ports and airports to French ships and aeroplanes. The French Ambassador was not allowed to return to Nigeria until 1965. How many recall that Nigeria backed Ahmed Ben Bella-led Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) war against the French colonial empire in Algeria?
-
Nigeria's magnanimous support for black South Africans during the existence of the apartheid regime has been repaid with rabid xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. In the 1970s, exiled ANC stalwarts (e.g. Thabo Mbeki) lived in the city of Lagos at Nigerian government expense. Any black South African family who made it to the shores of Nigeria got a stipend from the Nigerian government and their children went to school FREE OF CHARGE while Nigerian citizens had to pay for their kid's education. Does any black South African remember that today? Nope. The ANC government is busy humiliating Nigerians with onerous visa regimes while their traditional black voter base is busy killing Nigerians in periodic outbreaks of xenophobic violence
"One of the more frustrating aspects of studying policy on the Continent is the extent to which discourse tends to be divorced from objective reality" - couldn't agree more. As a student made it very hard to get my bearings.
Great piece, please keep it coming! It reminds me of my egyptian grandfather who dedicated his career to the continent, to “Um El Dunia”and knew a lot about the complexities of colonial and postcolonial africa…
A comment and question: how would the leading african economies be assessed? Mostly through (neoliberal western) GDP or would it use metrics focusing on industrial capacities and less on financialized and extractive sectors?
Regarding military strength would it consider a- Indigenous capacities b- Origin of imported hardware/software/knowledge.
Would an african state whose most military is made of a proprietary hardware/software with a litteral and metaphorical kill switch in DC/Tel Aviv/EU be as “atrong” as one with indigenous + mix of chinese/russian/indian/iran/EU/turkish imports and inputs?
European integration was driven by France and Germany. Are there 2 such countries who can be the linchpin to get the ball rolling and resist backsliding? Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire? Senegal? Kenya and Botswana? Uganda?
I found your analysis of African international organisations quite thought-provoking, and I thank you for it, but I'd like to challenge several of your core arguments.
While you correctly identify that weak states create weak international organisations, the example of Singapore significantly complicates this narrative. Singapore demonstrates that small states can become highly influential regional players through institutional capacity, diplomatic expertise, and economic strength, not merely size. Singapore's prominence in ASEAN reveals that what drives effectiveness isn't necessarily a state's geographic or demographic footprint but rather its governance capabilities.
This directly challenges your Nigeria-Burundi comparison. Rather than institutionalising power differentials based on size, perhaps African regional organisations should focus on building state capacity across all members while allowing natural leadership to emerge based on capability. The path to more effective regional cooperation might not require abandoning equality principles but rather addressing the underlying capacity issues preventing smaller states from becoming effective partners.
Additionally, you critique consensus-driven approaches without adequately exploring how to balance inclusivity with effectiveness. Your proposed solution of giving more institutional power to regional hegemons fails to address several critical tensions:
1. Legitimacy challenges: Marginalising smaller states in decision-making could undermine institutional legitimacy and erode political support.
2. Implementation realities: Even if powerful states drive decisions, implementation typically requires cooperation from all member states.
3. Diverse perspective benefits: Smaller states often bring unique insights that strengthen comprehensive regional policies.
Alternative models worth exploring include qualified majority voting (as used in the EU), variable geometry approaches allowing different integration speeds, functional specialisation enabling smaller states to lead in specific domains, and formal coalition-building mechanisms.
I believe you underestimate the importance of procedural justice. Research shows states are more likely to implement decisions they feel they had a voice in making. Without addressing these dimensions, simply shifting power to larger states risks creating new problems while solving old ones.
A more nuanced approach would recognise that effective regional organisations need both leadership from capable states and inclusive processes that build legitimacy and commitment from all members.
Bear in mind that I am not 100% certain that I have it all right, but these are just the things that occurred to me as I read your article. Thanks for listening.
I found your analysis of African international organisations quite thought-provoking, and I thank you for it, but I'd like to challenge several of your core arguments.
While you correctly identify that weak states create weak international organisations, the example of Singapore significantly complicates this narrative. Singapore demonstrates that small states can become highly influential regional players through institutional capacity, diplomatic expertise, and economic strength, not merely size. Singapore's prominence in ASEAN reveals that what drives effectiveness isn't necessarily a state's geographic or demographic footprint but rather its governance capabilities.
This directly challenges your Nigeria-Burundi comparison. Rather than institutionalising power differentials based on size, perhaps African regional organisations should focus on building state capacity across all members while allowing natural leadership to emerge based on capability. The path to more effective regional cooperation might not require abandoning equality principles but rather addressing the underlying capacity issues preventing smaller states from becoming effective partners.
Additionally, you critique consensus-driven approaches without adequately exploring how to balance inclusivity with effectiveness. Your proposed solution of giving more institutional power to regional hegemons fails to address several critical tensions:
1. Legitimacy challenges: Marginalising smaller states in decision-making could undermine institutional legitimacy and erode political support.
2. Implementation realities: Even if powerful states drive decisions, implementation typically requires cooperation from all member states.
3. Diverse perspective benefits: Smaller states often bring unique insights that strengthen comprehensive regional policies.
Alternative models worth exploring include qualified majority voting (as used in the EU), variable geometry approaches allowing different integration speeds, functional specialisation enabling smaller states to lead in specific domains, and formal coalition-building mechanisms.
I believe you underestimate the importance of procedural justice. Research shows states are more likely to implement decisions they feel they had a voice in making. Without addressing these dimensions, simply shifting power to larger states risks creating new problems while solving old ones.
A more nuanced approach would recognise that effective regional organisations need both leadership from capable states and inclusive processes that build legitimacy and commitment from all members.
Bear in mind that I am not 100% certain that I have it all right, but these are just the things that occurred to me as I read your article. Thanks for listening.
Friends in East Africa often address “the Mzungu in your pocket” syndrome that creates dependency thinking and doing. Politics, they often say, nurtures and perpetuates this problem. Then they add that the state is not the answer.
Great article with an exciting breadth of vision. There are certainly problems with the AU and the illusion of legitimacy it grants to minor despots of small underdeveloped nations. Such men (or women) are rarely visionary leaders. For example, Uebert Angel, a corrupt prosperity prophet/ambassador from Zimbabwe was given an AU post to weather the storm from his exposure in a multi-billion dollar gold smuggling scheme.
And yes, more broadly, there is a lack of serious continental leadership at present. The DRC crisis is evidence of this. There is no great statesman stepping up.
I do wonder what constitues a 'weak state' however? Economic and military power are mentioned. What about political stability? How would enormous DRC compare to tiny Rwanda for example?
And as other's have also mentioned, one wonders about the realpolitik implications. Ghana has been hosting islamist militans from Burkina Faso, Rwanda is working with M23, and Kenya under Ruto is fermenting chaos wherever possible. Would this new approach create an even worse power imbalance. A situation where the 'strong pray upon the weak, and the weak suffer what they must'?
Still the most interesting article I've read this week!
Your detailed analysis, is commendable and breathtaking.
Thanks for the great scholarly work. Yet, if i may express my despair, may i ask you…what is the solution to the quirkmire that you so skillfully describe?
I think explicitly ceding more control to larger states would not only go against what most Africans claim to have stood for at independence, it would also set very dangerous precedents.
This also ignores the way in which the current consensus-driven approach was itself the result of a pragmatic compromise. Why would anyone in Benin, for example, wish to see the whims and diktats of Abuja's policymakers given even more formal weight? Would they not decide they may as well back Francafrique? The current US administration has been contemplating absorbing various neighboring countries on the premise that they are too weak to fend for themselves in the big bad world. Crude as their logic may seem, they can at least credibly claim to be capable of offering defense and economic security in return.
To be blunt, all our 'regional hegemons' are simply catspaws for external interests. The various conflicts going aren't getting ignored. African neighbors typically don't just stand by, they have exploited them in the most cynical possible way. A concrete case: Kenya has been actively working to frustrate the defeat of a genocidal militia both diplomatically and through material assistance in exchange for concessionary terms on its debts from certain Gulf states. We nearly got our candidate elected AU chairman: would things have worked out well for Sudan if that position had even more power? And this is hardly an isolated example. Nigeria nearly invaded Niger to restore Bazoum at France's behest. Which of DRC's neighbors could be trusted with "agenda setting powers"? Would you like to see Ethiopia try to do to its neighbors what it has done to its citizens?
Furthermore, any analogy with European integration is deeply misleading: not only was the starting point much higher, there were also the common shocks of WWII and decolonization, the looming threat in the USSR, and of course massive US support. Nowhere else has anything remotely similar succeeded: not in the Middle East, not in South America, not in South/East Asia. A joint command structures for 55 poor countries half of whom are at war with themselves or each other is a pipe dream. As for nuclear deterrents: I confess I simply do not understand the fascination this elicits. Who exactly is being deterred, and from what? In what timeframe? Consider that the French nuclear deterrent, the only real one in Europe, hasn't even been factored into any of Russia's war plans. Of what plausible use would a handful of rudimentary nuclear warheads in Dakar, for example, be in the event of a major power incursion in North Africa? That's without even touching any of the massive practical challenges. I don't think anyone who's seriously looked into this believes it's a remotely workable idea.
The AU has calcified into a toothless organization. So be it. If it is now not capable of much good, at least it cannot do much harm, either by nurturing the delusions of its 'giants' or laundering the malign intentions of hostile external interests. Devolve its responsibilities to the regional bodies, where concrete economic and security planning can happen, adapted to local circumstances and on formally equal terms. If joint defense pacts need to be organized, this can continue at bilateral and regional level. But I can think of no darker future that us doing to each other what we fear being done to us, which is what this proposal would amount to in practice.
Agreed 100%
You hit the nail on the head with this article. African states are so weak and the larger African states with potentials are not pulling their weight at all.
The conflict in Sudan is almost 3 years and the AU has been so useless in terms of intervention and achieving a resemblance of peace. I wept the other day when I saw tiny Qatar playing peacemaker between Congo and Rwanda.
The 2 head of states were brought in front of a minster in Qatar to begin negotiations. Shame
A rich and interesting article.
I can speak from experience, three years of my diplomatic career was on African multilateral affairs, that there are extensive hurdles and challenges facing the revitalization of Pan - Africanism, may of them to do with circles of interests, political will, short vs long term goals, and the cadence of meetings, summits, and as you mentioned in this piece overlapping jurisidctions of various regional organizations.
A challenge to be sure, but one that needs to be addressed swiftly.
Well written!
Interesting article. Pan-Africanism has always (and will always) be a lofty Utopian dream by African leftists. Being Nigerian, I believe my country should concentrate on strengthening itself, expanding its small manufacturing sector, and uniting the West African subregion under its leadership as it had done successfully in the roaring 1970s. The rest of the continent should go pound sand and deal with themselves. Apart from expressing solidarity, Nigeria should not get too involved in affairs that are outside the West African subregion.
-
Nigeria should never return to the 1960s/1970s/1980s era of trying act Big Brother across the entire continent. That is foolish and would never pay off as experience shows.
-
How many people in Algeria remember that Nigerian government expelled the French Ambassador in January 1961 to protest France’s third nuclear bomb test in the Sahara Desert. The expulsion of the French Ambassador was followed by the closure of all Nigerian sea ports and airports to French ships and aeroplanes. The French Ambassador was not allowed to return to Nigeria until 1965. How many recall that Nigeria backed Ahmed Ben Bella-led Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) war against the French colonial empire in Algeria?
-
Nigeria's magnanimous support for black South Africans during the existence of the apartheid regime has been repaid with rabid xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. In the 1970s, exiled ANC stalwarts (e.g. Thabo Mbeki) lived in the city of Lagos at Nigerian government expense. Any black South African family who made it to the shores of Nigeria got a stipend from the Nigerian government and their children went to school FREE OF CHARGE while Nigerian citizens had to pay for their kid's education. Does any black South African remember that today? Nope. The ANC government is busy humiliating Nigerians with onerous visa regimes while their traditional black voter base is busy killing Nigerians in periodic outbreaks of xenophobic violence
Not everything is or needs to be a gain/loss spreadsheet of calculations
Nigeria supporting South African & Algerian independence was good thing to do regardless of what those societies chose to do after
"One of the more frustrating aspects of studying policy on the Continent is the extent to which discourse tends to be divorced from objective reality" - couldn't agree more. As a student made it very hard to get my bearings.
Great piece, please keep it coming! It reminds me of my egyptian grandfather who dedicated his career to the continent, to “Um El Dunia”and knew a lot about the complexities of colonial and postcolonial africa…
A comment and question: how would the leading african economies be assessed? Mostly through (neoliberal western) GDP or would it use metrics focusing on industrial capacities and less on financialized and extractive sectors?
Regarding military strength would it consider a- Indigenous capacities b- Origin of imported hardware/software/knowledge.
Would an african state whose most military is made of a proprietary hardware/software with a litteral and metaphorical kill switch in DC/Tel Aviv/EU be as “atrong” as one with indigenous + mix of chinese/russian/indian/iran/EU/turkish imports and inputs?
European integration was driven by France and Germany. Are there 2 such countries who can be the linchpin to get the ball rolling and resist backsliding? Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire? Senegal? Kenya and Botswana? Uganda?
I found your analysis of African international organisations quite thought-provoking, and I thank you for it, but I'd like to challenge several of your core arguments.
While you correctly identify that weak states create weak international organisations, the example of Singapore significantly complicates this narrative. Singapore demonstrates that small states can become highly influential regional players through institutional capacity, diplomatic expertise, and economic strength, not merely size. Singapore's prominence in ASEAN reveals that what drives effectiveness isn't necessarily a state's geographic or demographic footprint but rather its governance capabilities.
This directly challenges your Nigeria-Burundi comparison. Rather than institutionalising power differentials based on size, perhaps African regional organisations should focus on building state capacity across all members while allowing natural leadership to emerge based on capability. The path to more effective regional cooperation might not require abandoning equality principles but rather addressing the underlying capacity issues preventing smaller states from becoming effective partners.
Additionally, you critique consensus-driven approaches without adequately exploring how to balance inclusivity with effectiveness. Your proposed solution of giving more institutional power to regional hegemons fails to address several critical tensions:
1. Legitimacy challenges: Marginalising smaller states in decision-making could undermine institutional legitimacy and erode political support.
2. Implementation realities: Even if powerful states drive decisions, implementation typically requires cooperation from all member states.
3. Diverse perspective benefits: Smaller states often bring unique insights that strengthen comprehensive regional policies.
Alternative models worth exploring include qualified majority voting (as used in the EU), variable geometry approaches allowing different integration speeds, functional specialisation enabling smaller states to lead in specific domains, and formal coalition-building mechanisms.
I believe you underestimate the importance of procedural justice. Research shows states are more likely to implement decisions they feel they had a voice in making. Without addressing these dimensions, simply shifting power to larger states risks creating new problems while solving old ones.
A more nuanced approach would recognise that effective regional organisations need both leadership from capable states and inclusive processes that build legitimacy and commitment from all members.
Bear in mind that I am not 100% certain that I have it all right, but these are just the things that occurred to me as I read your article. Thanks for listening.
I found your analysis of African international organisations quite thought-provoking, and I thank you for it, but I'd like to challenge several of your core arguments.
While you correctly identify that weak states create weak international organisations, the example of Singapore significantly complicates this narrative. Singapore demonstrates that small states can become highly influential regional players through institutional capacity, diplomatic expertise, and economic strength, not merely size. Singapore's prominence in ASEAN reveals that what drives effectiveness isn't necessarily a state's geographic or demographic footprint but rather its governance capabilities.
This directly challenges your Nigeria-Burundi comparison. Rather than institutionalising power differentials based on size, perhaps African regional organisations should focus on building state capacity across all members while allowing natural leadership to emerge based on capability. The path to more effective regional cooperation might not require abandoning equality principles but rather addressing the underlying capacity issues preventing smaller states from becoming effective partners.
Additionally, you critique consensus-driven approaches without adequately exploring how to balance inclusivity with effectiveness. Your proposed solution of giving more institutional power to regional hegemons fails to address several critical tensions:
1. Legitimacy challenges: Marginalising smaller states in decision-making could undermine institutional legitimacy and erode political support.
2. Implementation realities: Even if powerful states drive decisions, implementation typically requires cooperation from all member states.
3. Diverse perspective benefits: Smaller states often bring unique insights that strengthen comprehensive regional policies.
Alternative models worth exploring include qualified majority voting (as used in the EU), variable geometry approaches allowing different integration speeds, functional specialisation enabling smaller states to lead in specific domains, and formal coalition-building mechanisms.
I believe you underestimate the importance of procedural justice. Research shows states are more likely to implement decisions they feel they had a voice in making. Without addressing these dimensions, simply shifting power to larger states risks creating new problems while solving old ones.
A more nuanced approach would recognise that effective regional organisations need both leadership from capable states and inclusive processes that build legitimacy and commitment from all members.
Bear in mind that I am not 100% certain that I have it all right, but these are just the things that occurred to me as I read your article. Thanks for listening.
Friends in East Africa often address “the Mzungu in your pocket” syndrome that creates dependency thinking and doing. Politics, they often say, nurtures and perpetuates this problem. Then they add that the state is not the answer.
Great article with an exciting breadth of vision. There are certainly problems with the AU and the illusion of legitimacy it grants to minor despots of small underdeveloped nations. Such men (or women) are rarely visionary leaders. For example, Uebert Angel, a corrupt prosperity prophet/ambassador from Zimbabwe was given an AU post to weather the storm from his exposure in a multi-billion dollar gold smuggling scheme.
And yes, more broadly, there is a lack of serious continental leadership at present. The DRC crisis is evidence of this. There is no great statesman stepping up.
I do wonder what constitues a 'weak state' however? Economic and military power are mentioned. What about political stability? How would enormous DRC compare to tiny Rwanda for example?
And as other's have also mentioned, one wonders about the realpolitik implications. Ghana has been hosting islamist militans from Burkina Faso, Rwanda is working with M23, and Kenya under Ruto is fermenting chaos wherever possible. Would this new approach create an even worse power imbalance. A situation where the 'strong pray upon the weak, and the weak suffer what they must'?
Still the most interesting article I've read this week!
This single post answered so many of the questions I have had about how African states operate today. Thank you!
Ken,
Your detailed analysis, is commendable and breathtaking.
Thanks for the great scholarly work. Yet, if i may express my despair, may i ask you…what is the solution to the quirkmire that you so skillfully describe?